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Introduction
Auto Capital is a licensed retail sales finance company located in New York State. It
operates to extend credit for the purpose of financing automobiles solely from a used automobile
dealership, City Motors. Together Auto Capital and City Motors operate as a buy-here-pay-here,1
a dealership at which customers are extended credit, buy a vehicle, and make payments. Buyhere-pay-here dealerships cater to customers with damaged credit or no credit, referred to as
subprime consumers. These customers are much more likely than prime customers are to default
on their loans, making these loans high risk. Traditionally, credit score has been used as a
primary lending criteria based on the idea that it indicates the likelihood that a borrower will
repay future obligations ("Selection and Use of Credit Scores," 2016). However, there are many
problems associated with using credit score alone to predict loan repayment. For example, credit
scores can be manipulated by lending agencies and through collections agencies. Credit score
also may not be an accurate representation of risk (Demyanyk, n.d.). In addition, many people in
the U.S. do not have a credit score. Many companies are beginning to use alternative measures to
underwrite, but there are no published studies on using this method for subprime auto loans. The
purpose of this thesis is to determine if measures other than credit score are predictors of loan
repayment for high-risk borrowers.
I tested several alternative measures selected based on non-standard underwriting models
in use and on the data I could access. These alternative measures are time-at-job, time-at-

1

Names have been changed to protect privacy
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residence, down payment, payment ratio, and disposable income. Of these measures, only down
payment and payment ratio were the significant predictors of loan repayment for the subprime
population.
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Background
BUY-HERE-PAY-HERE MODEL
The Buy-Here-Pay-Here model (henceforth “BHPH model”) originated in the 1970’s as a
response to the United States savings and loan crisis. Credit was difficult for many to obtain
through banks and rising vehicle prices made it prohibitive to buy with cash. In order for
dealerships to continue to sell vehicles, they began to set up related finance companies. Dealers
then realized they could profit both off the sale of the vehicle and from the loan. This type of
model became popular again after the financial crisis in 2008. Consumers again were having
difficulty obtaining financing from banks, especially those with poor credit. The BHPH model
evolved to cater specifically to customers with damaged credit. The credit scores of customers
served typically range from the mid 400’s upward to the low 600’s. These customers have a
much higher default risk than prime customers. In order to be profitable, it is key to select
customers that have the highest likelihood of repayment.

INDUSTRY AVERAGE DEFAULT RATE
The industry average for financing customers with these credit profiles results in three of
every ten loans failing (“Auto Capital Policy Manual,” 2015). This is huge compared to the
average prime auto loan default rate of 0.85% (Mantell, 2015). J.D. Byrider BHPH franchisees, a
national chain with 134 stores, generally expect a default rate of 25% (Sawyers, 2014; Parker,
2009). These high default rates make customer selection crucial to the success of the business.
Gary Tillery, owner of three J.D. Byrider BHPH’s in Albuquerque, New Mexico says, “It’s
strictly the underwriting and collection side that makes you profitable,” (Sawyers, 2014). Tillery
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is shooting for 22% default rate (Sawyers, 2014). With the proper collections and underwriting
process, it is possible to lower this default rate. Jonathan Gandolfo, dealer principal of three J.D.
Byrider stores in South Carolina, has a default rate of about 16.5% (Sawyers, 2014).

AUTO CAPITAL
Auto Capital was founded in 2009 to cater to the growing subprime population. Initially,
Auto Capital was performing at benchmark loan repayment levels. However, in 2014, as more of
Auto Capital portfolio matured, Auto Capital began to experience higher and higher repossession
and delinquency rates (G. Parks, 2016). At this point management was unable to determine
which characteristics caused one loan to perform better than another. Management assumed that
loans to customers with higher credit scores would perform better than those made to customers
with lower credit scores, but this had not yet been tested.

AUTO CAPITAL INTEREST RATE
Subprime lenders are under scrutiny in the state of New York. Auto Capital uses a
standard interest rate of 22.9% for all loans, regardless of credit score. In New York, interest
rates can be fixed or varied, so long as they are under the state maximum of 25%. Auto capital
uses a standard rate in order to eliminate the possibility of any discrimination or preferential
treatment (“Auto Capital Policy Manual,” 2015). This fixed rate also decreases Auto Capital’s
legal exposure to the New York State department of financial services and the Consumer Finance
Protection Bureau, as dealerships with variable rates are more of a target.
Both New York State and federal regulators are targeting subprime auto lending practices
("NYC Seeks to Remove," 2015). A state senate panel recently met with industry experts and
regulators to discuss ways to tighten subprime auto lending laws (Press, 2105). This is largely
8

due to issues with unfair lending practices, specifically interest rate variation. For example, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) ordered
Ally Bank and Ally Financial Inc. to pay $18 million in penalties and $80 million in damages to
harmed minority borrowers because the CFPB and DOJ determined that minority borrowers paid
higher interest rates for auto loans due to dealers varying interest rates (Ficklin, 2015). For the
same reason, Toyota Motor Credit was ordered to pay $19.9 million in restitution and American
Honda Finance Corporation was ordered to pay $24 million ("CFPB and DOJ Reach," 2016).
This happened because these lenders allowed dealers to vary the interest rate charged to
consumers.
The CFPB is urging these lenders to switch to a flat interest rate, which would eliminate
dealer markups and the potential for discriminatory lending. Ally has not yet made its system
compliant and has been ordered to pay harmed consumers every year until Ally eliminates
disparities or moves to a flat fee system ("CFPB and DOJ Reach," 2016). Toyota Motor Credit
and American Honda Finance Corporation have been forced to reduce the amount interest rates
can be varied to a maximum of 1.25 percentage points or to switch to a flat fee (Lutz, 2015 &
“CFPB and DOJ Reach," 2016). In order to avoid these legal problems, some lenders such as
BB&T have preemptively switched to a flat rate (Henry, 2015).

WHY AUTO CAPITAL NEEDS ALTERNATIVE UNDERWRITING
As banks are loosening their lending policies and beginning to lend to non-prime
customers again, Auto Capital is losing its applicants with the highest credit scores (G. Parks,
2016). In addition, Auto Capital is facing more competition in the market. Therefore, Auto
Capital would benefit from an alternative way to assess customer qualification. Auto Capital
currently uses some alternative measures to qualify a customer, however management is not sure
9

which measures actually predict loan repayment. If Auto Capital management was aware of what
indicated a higher probability of loan repayment, it could more accurately filter customers and
approve only those with the highest probability for success. A systematic measure such as this
would help to decrease default and delinquency, which would increase Auto Capital’s
profitability without raising additional concerns of discrimination or unfair lending practices.

PROBLEMS WITH CREDIT SCORES
Fair Isaac Corp.’s credit score (FICO) was initially meant to be used in the underwriting
process along with vetting potential borrowers by checking tax returns, pay stubs, employers,
and so on, to help banks in determining their customers’ creditworthiness. However, the FICO
score became seen as a stand-alone statistic that communicated the quality of a loan. Lenders
stopped vetting potential borrowers and instead relied on credit score alone (Foust & Pressman,
2008). This was a huge problem for people without a credit score and it became a problem for
many lenders.
There are many underbanked consumers in the US due to lack of credit score. One in
every 10 adults in the United States does not have a credit score (“Millions of consumers,”
2015), which is about 26 million people. In addition, 19 million consumers have “unscored”
credit records, meaning they do not have a report with recently reported information or they do
not have enough credit history for a credit score to be generated (“Millions of consumers,”
2015). Even if a consumer does have a credit score, it can be manipulated by both lenders and
through the collections agency system.
In the past, lenders have manipulated FICO scores in order to help people qualify for
credit cards and mortgages that they could not afford (Foust & Pressman, 2008). Some “credit
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doctors” began to help borrowers “juice their FICO scores” using legal and illegal tricks (Foust
& Pressman, 2008). According to Anthony B. Sanders, a finance professor at Arizona State
University and former head of asset-backed research at Deutche Bank in New York, “The more
heavily lenders and bankers relied on credit scores, the more mistakes were made” (Foust &
Pressman, 2008).
Another way credit scores can be manipulated is through collections agencies. When a
collections agency registers an item on a credit report, the only way to improve that credit score
is time. It can take seven to ten years for items to disappear completely. As the collection item
ages, it affects credit score less. However, whether or not someone pays off the item does not
affect the score. A way around this is “pay for delete” in which case if the collections agency is
paid, they will delete the item from the credit report. This can have a significant effect someone’s
credit score. Because of these shortcomings, lenders began to look more closely at FICO scores’
ability to predict risk, especially after the subprime housing bubble burst.
In the wake of the Great Recession, many began to blame Fair Isaac, “arguing that its
score didn’t predict delinquencies as expected” (Foust & Pressman, 2008). For example, when
comparing five different groups of borrowers with different FICO scores when their loans were
made, the higher the credit score, the larger the increase in serious delinquency rate one year
after the loan was made (Demyanyk, n.d.). Serious delinquency is defined as a borrower missing
more than two monthly payments or defaulting on a loan (Demyanyk, n.d.). For those with FICO
scores between 500 and 600, the rate of serious delinquency doubled from 2005 to 2007,
compared to those with FICO scores above 700, whose serious delinquency rate quadrupled in
the same time period (Demyanyk, n.d.). Furthermore, the serious delinquency rate for those with
FICO scores 700 and above in 2007 was almost the same as the rate in 2005 for those with FICO
11

scores between 500 and 600 (Demyanyk, n.d.). This suggests that credit score did not act as a
predictor of default risk like so many believed it was. Discover Financial Services Chief
Executive David W. Nelms told analysts “So many people, I think incorrectly, looked at FICO as
being the measure of risk,” (Foust & Pressman, 2008). Due to these issues, lenders began to
create new lending models that did not rely as heavily on credit score.

COMPANIES USING NON-STANDARD UNDERWRITING
There were many other risk measures used before credit score dominated underwriting.
For example, income was previously widely used, but only recently has it again been given
precedence in some underwriting models. Some believe that income is actually one of the best
measures of risk, along with employment tenure, which are not factored into credit scoring
models (Biundo, 2015). Many companies are beginning to revert to these methods, using “nonstandard” underwriting practices in order to supplement and/or replace systems that rely on
credit scores. Many of these new systems claim to be more accurate at predicting loan repayment
than systems that rely more heavily on credit score.

ZEST FINANCE
Zest Finance is a company that uses “big” data, defined as large complex data sets
containing a variety of data types, to underwrite loans for the subprime population. They analyze
thousands of potential credit variables ranging from financial information to technology usage.
Douglas Merrill, the founder of Zest Finance, discloses that one signal used is whether someone
has given up a prepaid wireless phone number (Hardy, 2015). If they have, it is a bad sign as it
indicates someone is willing or has been forced to disappear from those they know (Hardy,
2015). These non-standard data signals help Zest create a better idea of who is going to repay
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their debt. Zest claims that their model “provides a 40% improvement over the current best in
class industry score,” ("Zest Finance," n.d.). Merrill believes that this his method of “data-driven
analysis of personality” is a better and more fair method than standard measures because of the
difference between ability and willingness to pay (Hardy, 2015). Ability to pay is simply having
the money to pay while willingness to pay is the level of importance one places on repaying their
debt. Merrill said, “If all you look at is financial transactions, it’s hard to say much about
willingness,” (Hardy, 2015). Many other firms are beginning to place increased importance on
willingness to pay over ability to pay as well.

UPSTART
Upstart is another company using non-traditional data to underwrite loans based on
willingness to pay rather than ability to pay alone. Upstart uses information such as level of
education, SAT score, college attended, major, and GPA to determine a loan rate ("Upstart,"
n.d.). Paul Gu, Upstarts co-founder, said that “If you take two people with the same job and
circumstances, like whether they have kids, five years later the one who had the higher G.P.A is
more likely to repay the debt,” (Hardy, 2015). He goes on to say, “It’s not a question of whether
you can pay, it’s a question of how important you see the obligation,” (Hardy, 2015). The
concept, validated by data, is that those who took the extra time to study extra and double check
their homework are “through and more likely to honor their debts,” (Hardy, 2015).

SOFI
SoFi is a lending company that also places importance on willingness to pay. SoFi uses
an underwriting model based on college attended, major, employment, and income in addition to
FICO score ("Great Rates and a Lifetime of Benefits L SoFi," n.d.). SoFi does not specialize in
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auto loans but will make a personal loan for things such as a vehicle, paying off credit cards,
home improvement projects, medical expenses and home mortgages ("Great Rates and a
Lifetime of Benefits L SoFi," n.d.).

EARNEST
Earnest uses an underwriting model based on monthly cash flow ("Earnest," n.d.). They
look at customer bank accounts, income, and spending. If they have enough cash flow to add a
loan payment, they will issue the loan.

CAR CREDIT NATION
Car Credit Nation does no credit check financing. In a phone interview with Jack Keller,
a sales person at Car Credit Nation in Winchester, Virginia, I learned what is necessary to get a
loan; a down payment of $500-$1000, income of at least $300 per month, proof of this income,
and proof of residence such as a piece of mail (J. Keller, Personal communication, March, 2016).
If someone meets these standards, Car Credit Nation will issue the loan.

AUTOZOOM
AutoZoom is a company that creates custom scoring models for BHPH dealerships using
predictive underwriting. The company has based its model on forty years of underwriting
experience and data from over one million BHPH transactions ("AutoZoom," n.d.). AutoZoom
claims that use of its model will enable dealerships to make better underwriting decisions. The
AutoZoom model incorporates many different variables, including credit score, residence
stability, job stability, number of times repossessed, down payment, monthly payment ratio, and
income source in order to produce a final score. The dealership sets a benchmark score and then
underwrites a loan only if the AutoZoom score is above the benchmark. The total score can also
14

be compared from loan to loan, which allows dealerships to see what measures are producing
loans with the best repayment. This enables lenders to improve their underwriting by
standardizing acceptable ranges that result in the most successful loans.
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Methods
Based on the factors listed above and the data I could collect from Auto Capital, my
hypothesis is that disposable income, the time someone has spent at their residence, the time
someone has spent at their job, the down payment made, and the payment ratio can be used to
predict loan repayment.

VARIABLES
LOAN REPAYMENT
Loan repayment is the dependent variable and is measured as the ratio of the total amount
paid divided by the amount of the loan. The total amount paid includes the down payment and
the total of monthly payments made. The total amount of the loan varies only slightly from loan
to loan with an average loan amount of $10,800 and a standard deviation of $1,430. There is no
significant difference in loan amount between the bottom half of the sample and the top half
when divided by credit score.

CREDIT SCORE
The FICO credit score was measured as the reported score on file. The credit score
should be positively correlated with the dependent variable because credit score is representative
of capacity to repay a loan. If someone has a higher capacity for repayment, they should pay a
higher percentage of their loan off.

TIME-AT-RESIDENCE
The time-at-residence was measured as how long an individual has lived in their current
residence in years. This should be positively correlated with loan repayment because the time
16

someone has lived in one place is representative of the stability of their life and is a predictor of
their future intent. If they have been in one home for a long time, it is assumed that they will
stay, decreasing the risk that they will run away with the vehicle and increasing the likelihood
that they will continue making payments.

TIME-AT-JOB
The time-at-job was measured as how long an individual has held their current job in
years. The time-at-job should be positively correlated with loan repayment. This is because the
time someone has spent at their job is representative of the stability of their income. If someone
has a stable income, the likelihood that they will continue making payments increases.

PAYMENT RATIO
The payment ratio was measured as the monthly payment divided by total monthly
income. This should be negatively correlated with loan repayment because those with a high
payment in relation to income are more likely to stop payment if their income stream is even
slightly reduced.

DOWN PAYMENT
The down payment was measured in dollars as the total down payment before beginning
monthly payments. This should be positively correlated with loan repayment because the down
payment contributes to total amount paid and a high down payment is representative of ability to
make future payments.
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DISPOSABLE INCOME
Disposable income was measured in dollars as the monthly amount remaining after all
planned expenses such as taxes, rent or mortgage payment, $250 for miscellaneous expenses and
the individual’s monthly car payment. These expenses are included for every customer.
Additional expenses are self-reported by the customer such as child support, cable bill, phone
bill, and insurance. However, the amount of additionally reported expenses is verified through
obtaining a copy of the bill. Auto Capital management believes that people are generally honest
in reporting additional expenses (G. Parks, 2016). Disposable income should be positively
correlated with the dependent variable. This is because if someone has more money to spend,
they are more likely to continue making their payment.

POINTS
As a robustness measure, all variables above were then converted into a points system
based on the AutoZoom scoring method. For each variable, a conversion into points was created
as shown below in Table 1.

Table 1
Points Model Scoring
Disposable Income
Lower
300
800
1300
2100
2900
3700
4500
5300
6100
6900

Upper
800
1300
2100
2900
3700
4500
5300
6100
6900
7700

Points
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

Payment Ratio
Lower
0%
2%
6%
10%
14%
18%
22%
26%

Upper
2%
6%
10%
14%
18%
22%
26%
40%

Down Payment
Points
7
5
3
1
0
-1
-3
-5

Notes: the lower range is inclusive
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Lower
0
1
500
1000
1500
2000
2500

Upper
1
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
5000

Residence and Job
Points
-5
-3
0
3
5
7
10

Lower
0
1
3
5
7

Upper
1
3
5
7
+

Points
-1
0
1
2
3

Regression Model
Based on the relationships predicted, the following regression equations were used to test if the
independent variables were predictors of loan repayment.
Model 1
Y1 = β0 + β1(Credit Score) + ε
Model 2
Y2 = β0 + β1(Time at Job) + β2(Time at Residence) + β3(Payment Ratio) + β4(Disposable Income)
+ β5(Down Payment) + ε
Model 3
Y2 = β0 + β1(Points Time at Job) + β2(Points Time at Residence) + β3(Points Payment Ratio) +
β4(Points Disposable Income) + β5(Points Down Payment) + ε
Model 4
Y2 = β0 + β1(Points Time at Job) + β2(Points Time at Residence) + β3(Points Payment Ratio) +
β4(Points Disposable Income) + β5(Points Down Payment) + β6(Credit Score) + ε

DATA
A random sample of closed loan files with an origination date between when Auto
Capital opened in 2009 and the end of 2011 were selected for the starting sample. This date
range was chosen in order to ensure the loan was closed as the longest possible loan term is 48
months. I reviewed 264 loan files, with 215 files including credit score and 189 files having all
of the data needed to test the desired variables not including credit score. This was partially due
to Auto Capital’s poor filing system and partially due to some customers not having enough
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credit history to have a credit score. The 215 files with credit score were used to determine if
credit score was a significant predictor of loan repayment in model one. The 189 files were used
in models two and three. Only 161 files had data on all variables including credit score. These
files were used for model four. Auto Capital verifies income and time at job through paystubs,
unemployment awards, SSI/retirement benefits awards letters, and phone calls to employers.
Time at residence is also verified through calling property owners and mortgage companies.
The descriptive statistics for the data is shown below in Table 2. The average customer
pays 72% of their loan; however, there is a large variation in this as shown by the standard
deviation. Loan repayment can go well over 100% due to interest. The average customer has a
credit score of 522 and makes a down payment of $500 but this also varies considerably. The
average time at residence and time at job is about 6 years, which is well above the median. This
is due to a few customers that have lived in the same home and held the same job for 40 years or
more.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics

Mean
Median
SD
Range
Minimum
Maximum

Loan
Repayment

Credit
Score

Payment
Ratio

Disposable
Income

Down
Payment

72.0%
61.8%
45.6%
162.6%
3.3%
166.0%

521.8
524.0
62.3
299.0
388.0
687.0

8.2%
7.7%
3.9%
24.0%
1.6%
25.6%

$1,454
$1,082
$1,071
$6,849
$307
$7,156

$628
$500
$515
$4,000
$0
$4,000

Time at
Residence
5.7
3.0
7.9
50.0
0.0
50.0

Time at
Job
6.1
2.0
9.1
55.0
0.0
55.0

I examined the relationship between loan term, amount of the loan, and credit score in
order to ensure these factors did not affect the dependent variable. Credit score and loan term
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were not correlated (r = .083), nor was credit score and loan amount (r = -.067). Using a
difference of means test to compare the top half of the sample with the bottom half based on
credit score, no significant difference was found between the loan amounts (p = 0.368) or the
loan terms (p = 0.332). Therefore, loan term and loan amount do not have an impact.
In addition, I examined the correlation between predictor variables to ensure there was
not a multicollinearity issue. As shown in Table 3, all correlations were between -30% and 30%
indicating weak correlation between variables.

Table 3
Correlation Between Predictor Variables
Variable
Credit Score
Payment Ratio
Disposable Income
Down Payment
Years at Residence
Years at Job

Credit Score
100.0%
19.0%
-11.9%
8.9%
14.9%
-0.3%

Payment Ratio
100.0%
-26.9%
-2.2%
8.5%
-2.1%

Disposable Income Down Payment Years at Residence

100.0%
8.9%
5.4%
-5.5%
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100.0%
7.1%
-0.4%

100.0%
17.1%

Years at Job

100.0%

Results
As a control, a linear regression (Model 1) was conducted in order to determine if credit
score predicted loan repayment. A significant regression equation was found with regression
coefficients and significance shown in Table 4. Credit score was a significant predictor of loan
repayment (p<.0014). Loan repayment increased 0.00165 for each point of credit score.
An OLS regression, (Model 2) was calculated to predict loan repayment based on time at
job, time at residence, payment ratio, disposable income, and down payment. A significant
regression was found with regression coefficients and significance shown in Table 4. Of the
predictor variables, only down payment and payment ratio were significant (p <0.05) predictors
of loan repayment. This is surprising as the lack of significance of disposable income suggests
that the amount of money one has, or ability to pay, does not influence the amount of their loan
that they pay back. Furthermore, this suggests that the stability of one’s life as measured by the
time at job and time at residence does not influence loan repayment of high-risk borrowers
either.
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Table 4
Multiple Linear Regression of Loan Repayment by Model
Variable
Model 1
Intercept
Credit Score
F(1,215) = 10.49

β

SE(β)

-0.13854

0.26733
0.0005

P

Adj. R

2

0.6048
0.0014
0.0425

Model 2
Intercept
Time at Job
Time at Residence
Payment Ratio
Disposable Income
Down Payment
F(5,183) = 8.41

0.75304
-0.00287
0.00276
-2.22125
-0.00004
0.00033

Model 3
Intercept
Points Time at Job
Points Time at Residence
Points Payment Ratio
Points Disposable Income
Points Down Payment
F(5,183) = 9.46

0.55691
0.01738
0.02895
0.04692
-0.01309
0.07107

Model 4
Intercept
Time at Job
Time at Residence
Payment Ratio
Disposable Income
Down Payment
Credit Score
F(6, 154) = 6.38

0.44001
-0.00397
0.00106
-1.78169
-0.00007
0.00034
0.00049

0.12673
0.00004
0.00336
0.00399
0.00006
0.99452

0.55691
-0.01309
0.07107
0.04692
0.01738
0.02895

0.30606
0.00379
0.00438
1.13365
0.00004
0.00006
0.00006

<.0001
0.3929
0.4892
0.0267
0.3022
<.0001
<.0001

0.1647

<.0001
0.3650
0.1409
0.0275
0.4575
<.0001
<.0001

0.1836

0.15260
0.29650
0.80930
0.11810
0.84560
<.001
0.37820
0.1679

Notes: Model 1 N = 215, Model 2 and 3 N = 189, Model 4 N =161
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As a robustness measure, a second OLS regression, (Model 3) was also calculated to
predict loan repayment based on residence points, job points, payment ratio points, down
payment points, and disposable income points. Each original data point was converted into a
point value previously determined from a sample AutoZoom score sheet. The scoring method
used is detailed in Table 1. A significant regression equation was found with the regression
coefficients and significance shown in Table 4. Again, of the independent variables, only down
payment points and payment ratio points were significant (p <0.05) predictors of loan repayment.
This is in line with the results from model two and suggests once again that stability measures do
not predict loan repayment for high-risk borrowers, nor does ability to pay.
A fourth OLS regression was calculated to determine if these results held true when
credit score is included in the model. A significant regression equation was found with the
regression coefficients and significance detailed in Table 4. Of the independent variables, only
down payment was a significant predictor of loan repayment at the five percent significance
level. Therefore, down payment was the most significant predictor of loan repayment in the
subprime population.
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Conclusion
As the subprime auto loan market changes, Auto Capital must adapt in order to stay
competitive. Banks are beginning to underwrite to non-prime customers again, causing Auto
Capital to lose applicants with the highest credit scores. Furthermore, many Americans do not
have a credit score and there is some evidence that credit scores are not necessarily accurate
predictors of risk or likelihood of repayment. If Auto Capital continues to use credit score as the
primary predictor of loan repayment, it risks selecting a poor customer base in addition to losing
some potential borrowers. The underwriting process, which determines what customers are
issued loans, is the most important factor for the success of a BHPH dealership. As down
payment and payment ratio were significant predictors of loan repayment for the subprime
population that Auto Capital primarily lends to, incorporating them into Auto Capital’s
underwriting model would aid in the selection of customers with the highest likelihood for
repayment. This would help Auto Capital to create a customer base with less delinquency and
default, which would increase profitability and allow Auto Capital to stay competitive in a
changing market.
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